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Captive finance firms play an important role as financial intermediaries. Yet, they receive little attention 
in financial research. Recently, finance companies have grown by engaging in acquisition activities. 
Given their unique characteristics, finance companies may be more capable of extracting gains from 
acquisitions than other firms. We explain their advantages, and assess the market response and long-term 
valuation of finance companies that engage in acquisitions. Our results indicate that acquisitions by 
captive finance firms are wealth enhancing in the short term and the long term. However, the market 
reacts negatively when flexible captive financing firms acquire highly regulated depository institutions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Captive finance companies compete with depository financial institutions in the market for loans. The 
unique characteristics of captive firms affect their ability to compete in the loan market. Since captive 
finance companies cannot offer insured checkable or savings deposits, they are forced to obtain funding in 
other ways, which are more expensive than deposits. This may restrict them from channeling their funds 
to the most credit worthy borrowers, because the spread over their cost may be too narrow.  
On the favorable side, finance companies are not subject to the regulations that are imposed on 
depository institutions.  Therefore, they avoid explicit and implicit costs associated with complying with 
FDIC regulations. This advantage may be especially acute when they attempt to expand, because they 
have more flexibility to grow the business without being required to boost capital. Conversely, depository 
institutions are more restricted because of their capital requirements, and must maintain higher capital 
levels as they grow. Depository institutions are less able to leverage their growth, because they normally 
raise their capital proportionately in line with their growth in assets. Furthermore, depository institutions 
may be forced to increase their capital requirement percentage if their new assets are viewed as more 
risky than their existing assets. In addition, finance companies are more capable of leveraging their 
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growth to achieve a higher return on equity, which may translate into higher valuations. Thus, finance 
companies may be rivals to depository institutions for acquisition targets.  
Our objective is to estimate valuation effects of acquisitions by finance companies, and also to assess 
their performance following acquisitions. We find a favorable stock price response to acquisitions by 
captive finance companies. In addition, parent companies whose captive finance subsidiaries participate 
in an acquisition experience positive and significant long run returns. The long run returns are more 
favorable following the acquisition of targets that are not subject to bank regulations.  
 
Background 
Captive finance companies are linked with many types of firms, including   automobile, financial, and 
retail companies. They were originally intended to function as the lending arm of their parent companies, 
and focused on equipment financing or personal loans.  In recent years, they have begun to take active 
roles in the capital markets. Their business focus has branched out from customer financing to 
commercial real estate, business loan portfolios, and finance receivables.  The captive finance company 
segment is one of the fastest growing in today’s financial markets. As captive finance companies continue 
to grow, they become more attractive to targets as potential acquirers or partners. For example, in 2002, 
Newbridge Capital acquired Shenzhen Development Bank of China. There was concern by Shenzhen that 
being acquired by a commercial bank would create a situation where they would be considered an 
extension of existing operations or just another branch. They actively sought to sell to a non-banking 
institution thereby avoiding this situation (WorldSources, Inc., 2002).  
Captive finance companies have increasingly employed an acquisition strategy to increase their 
market penetration and scope. For instance, in the case of Textron Financial Corporation, a subsidiary of 
Textron Inc., the captive firm acquired approximately $400 million in assets from STI Credit Corporation, 
a subsidiary of SunTrust Credit. Stephen A. Giliotti, chairman, president and CEO of Textron Financial 
made the following remarks: 
 
"This strategic acquisition gives us an excellent opportunity to diversify and leverage our 
existing small business group products using SunTrust Credit's proven origination and 
service platform. This will allow us to expand our market reach, gain new customers 
more cost effectively, and achieve 10 to 15 percent growth per year in this business 
(Business Wire, 2001)." 
 
Finance companies are similar to commercial banks and savings institutions in that they serve the 
market for loans, equipment leasing, and credit card financing. However, finance companies tend to focus 
on consumer or small business finance and equipment leasing, while commercial banks traditionally focus 
on business loans and services, and savings institutions focus on mortgages. As a wholly owned 
subsidiary of their parent company, the captive finance company can utilize the full backing and financial 
power of their parent (Remolana and Wulfekuhler, 1992). As a subsidiary of a larger company, the 
management of a captive finance company is under scrutiny by upper management as well as board 
members; they experience evaluation of their operations to a greater degree (Subrahmanyam, Ranjan and 
Rosenstein, 1997). This may constrain their merger and acquisition activity to those that truly maximize 
shareholder value, rather then growth for its own sake. Captive finance companies have special 
knowledge of their particular industry when determining the value of a target (Haynes, 1996). They seek 
targets that will allow them to capitalize on their best business practices leading to profitable expansion.  
In addition, there are important regulatory differences between finance companies and depository 
institutions. While depository institutions can rely on relatively low-cost deposits, finance companies 
must rely on the issuance of securities, such as commercial paper (Remolana and Wulfekuhler, 1992). 
This regulatory difference places finance companies at a disadvantage. However, this difference also 
means that finance companies are not subject to the scrutiny that depository institutions must face as a 
result of using federally insured depositor funds. Finance companies are subject to oversight by state 
agencies, but there are no national regulations governing acquisitions by finance companies (Carey, Post, 
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and Sharpe, 1998). Conversely, depository institutions such as banks and savings institutions are subject 
to more stringent national regulations when pursuing an acquisition. Bank regulators such as the FDIC 
must consider the needs of the community (Berger, Demsetz, and Stichan, 1999). Second, the FDIC 
cannot approve a bank acquisition that will lessen competition; hence, the application process requires 
that a potential bank acquirer show evidence that competition will not be reduced (Berger, Demsetz, and 
Stichan, 1999). Third, depository institutions are subject to capital requirements, and must ensure that 
they will satisfy capital guidelines when completing an acquisition (Berger, Demsetz, and Stichan, 1999). 
The capital adequacy guidelines are also important because they can affect the market’s perception of an 
acquisition. Even if a depository institution satisfies national regulations regarding its capital adequacy, it 
may be subject to market concerns that it will have to raise capital in the future to support the integration 
of the merged companies. The market may penalize an acquirer that will likely need to raise more capital 
after an acquisition, because its return on equity may be reduced as a result. Unlike depository 
institutions, captive finance companies can pursue acquisitions without being required to meet specific 
capital requirements. Thus, finance companies have more financial flexibility when pursuing acquisitions.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Research on Captive Finance Companies 
Research on finance companies has been limited. Studies, such as Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992) 
have focused on the characteristics of captive finance firms and finance companies. Others, such as 
Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) and Barron, Chong, and Staten (2004) investigate the lending 
characteristics of captive finance firms. Roberts and Viscione (1981) find that captive firms permit the 
parent company to take on more debt. Bodnaruk, O’Brien and Simonov (2016) show that parent firms 
achieve greater market share and profitability by establishing a captive finance subsidiary, although 
approximately four years is required for benefits to be achieved. 
The literature indicates that captive finance subsidiaries improve efficiency within an organization by 
restructuring the method in which financing functions are handled. They improve upon the internal 
monitoring and vetting of borrowers, and this facilitates their lending practices. While they sometimes 
target the market for relatively high-risk borrowers they also compete with other lending institutions in 
markets for all forms of borrowers (Haynes, 1996).  
 
Research on Bank Acquisitions 
The closest research related to acquisitions by finance companies is the large set of studies on 
acquisitions by commercial banks. Due to deregulation in the banking industry, there has been a surge in 
the merger and acquisition activity in the bank sector. The approval of interstate banking and the removal 
of restrictions on in-state branching have resulted in numerous acquisitions by banks and bank holding 
companies (see Jayaratne and Strahan, (1998) and Calem (1994)). The allowance, by the Federal Reserve, 
for banks to participate in underwriting activities through “Section 20” affiliates resulted in many banking 
mergers and acquisitions (see Saunders (1999)). The motives behind banking acquisitions have been 
examined in several studies. Some evidence exists that the mergers and acquisitions are an attempt to 
become “too big to fail”, and increase access to the Federal Reserve safety net has been documented by 
Saunders and Wilson (1999). Traditionally only banks or bank holding companies were able to acquire 
banking targets.  
There is evidence that banking acquirers overpay for targets when the interest of management are not 
properly aligned with those of the firm (Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein, 1997). In general, 
research suggests that commercial banks experienced negative or neutral valuation effects in response to 
acquisition announcements and weak performance following their acquisitions. However, the results from 
these studies cannot be used to make inferences about finance company acquisitions, because the 
structure and operations of finance companies differ from that of a typical commercial bank. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 
Hypothesis Regarding Impact on Wealth 
When captive finance companies acquire non-financial businesses, they can offer financing to the 
customer base of the target. Thus, they not only generate business, but can enhance the cash flows of a 
business that they acquire by offering financing to target customers. Captive finance firms may add 
expertise due to their niche knowledge (Haynes, 1996), and may use this knowledge in the target selection 
and negotiation of the acquisition. Consequently, we hypothesize that acquisition announcements by 
finance companies will elicit a favorable market response. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Captive finance acquisitions will have positive abnormal returns. 
 
Hypothesis Regarding Impact of Acquiring Banking Targets 
A significant portion of captive finance company acquisitions has been focused on depository 
institutions. When captive finance companies pursue depository institutions, they enter a more regulated 
environment (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999) and cannot capitalize on regulatory arbitrage. 
Furthermore, the costs of regulatory compliance may be especially high for a parent company that does 
not have experience with such compliance. Therefore, finance companies are expected to experience less 
favorable valuation effects when acquiring depository institutions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Captive finance acquisitions will have lower abnormal returns if the target 
firm is a depository institution. 
 
DATA 
 
The sample of captive finance acquisitions was taken from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
mergers and acquisitions database. The mergers and acquisitions included ranged from 1980 through 
2003. The captive finance firms included are subsidiaries of parent companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ. The original dataset was reduced from 1019 to 
525 after excluding stock repurchases, self-tender offers, withdrawn offers and firms whose return data 
was unavailable from CRSP.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of captive finance acquisitions by year and SIC code. There is an 
obvious acceleration in acquisition between 1997 and 2000. This period coincides with a booming 
economy and the ultimate passage of the Financial Modernization Act. The majority of captive finance 
companies fall into the 9000 SIC code. The second most prevalent SIC codes are the 6000’s representing 
financial services companies.  
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TABLE 1 
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ACQUISITIONSAB 
 
Panel A  by Year 
Year of  
Announcement 
Number of 
Announcements 
Percent of Total 
1980 1 0.19% 
1981 3 0.57% 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
4 
8 
2 
11 
11 
13 
0.76% 
1.52% 
0.38% 
2.10% 
2.10% 
2.48% 
1988 14 2.67% 
1989 17 3.24% 
1990 19 3.62% 
1991 12 2.29% 
1992 13 2.48% 
1993 23 4.38% 
1994 20 3.81% 
1995 29 5.52% 
1996 32 6.10% 
1997 71 13.52% 
1998 69 13.14% 
1999 49 9.33% 
2000 25 4.76% 
2001 29 5.52% 
2002 28 5.33% 
2003 22 4.19% 
Total 
Announcements 
525 100% 
 
A This panel provides the distribution of announcements by year of acquisition.  
Panel B by SIC Code 
SIC Code Number of Announcements Percent of Total 
1000-1999 1 0.19% 
2000-2999 2 0.38% 
3000-3999 48 9.14% 
4000-4999 18 3.43% 
5000-5999 6 1.14% 
6000-6999 214 40.76% 
7000-7999 11 2.10% 
9000-9999 225 42.86% 
Total 
Announcements 
525 100% 
B This panel provides the distribution of announcements by SIC code of Target’s Primary SIC 
code. 
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Descriptive statistics of the operational factors of the acquiring companies are documented in Table 2. 
The results show that acquirers are large companies that are highly profitable. The mean (median) value 
of Total Assets is $201 billion ($192 billion), with an ROE of 17.89% (20.30%.) The firms hold a mean 
(median) leverage value of 41.38% (47.70%.) 
 
TABLE 2 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
This table documents the mean and median values for the acquiring firm in the year  
prior to the acquisition. 
 
Variable Mean 
(Median) 
Assets ($millions) 201,321.27 
(192,876.00) 
Market Value ($millions) 118,782.40 
(66,105.34) 
ROA 2.37 
(2.61) 
ROE 17.89 
(20.30) 
Debt to Total Assets 41.38 
(47.70) 
Cash and Cash Equivalents to 
Total Assets 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Estimating the Impact on Wealth 
Event study methodology was used to test the impact of the acquisition announcement on the returns 
of the acquirer. The event day, designated as day 0, is the original announcement day of the acquisition. 
Standard event study methodology is used to measure the average abnormal stock returns on the t-days 
surrounding the event, the ordinary least squares market model is used. A 110-day estimation period was 
chosen to reflect normal returns in a period where an acquisition did not occur. Abnormal returns for the 
(0,+1), (-1, +1), (0, 0) and (-1,0) windows are estimated and examined. The CRSP equally weighted index 
is used as the market proxy; the study was done using Eventus (Cowan, 1999).  
 
Estimating the Impact on Wealth in the Long-Run 
The impact of the acquisition announcement on long-run returns of the acquirer is measured using 
traditional event study methodology and a buy and hold strategy. The long run abnormal returns are 
calculated for the six month, one year, eighteen month, two and three year periods.  
 
RT =  Π  [ 1+ Rit /nt] -1                 (1) 
 
Where RT is the return over the event period of six, twelve, eighteen months etc. Rit is the return on 
stock I in month t and nt is the number of companies that are included in each month (Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai, 1999). To evaluate the significance of long-run returns, two control samples were constructed. The 
first was matched on ultimate parent SIC code, where the matched sample did not participate in an 
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acquisition over the same time period. The second consists of large banks that may have been affected by 
the captive finance acquisitions over the same time period.  
 
Cross-Sectional Regressions to Determine Characteristics that Effect Wealth 
To explain the variation in wealth effects surrounding the announcement, cross-sectional regression 
models are used. The cross-sectional models include the hypothesized variables, along with the following 
control variables. The cross-sectional model is specified as: 
 
CAR = β0 + β 1LNMVL + β 2CASH + β 3DEBT + β 4BANK + β 5PRE-1999 + β 6EBITDA +  
β 7DIVERSE + εI                               (2) 
 
Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over 1 day window, (0,0), LNMVL is the log of 
market value of acquirer, CASH is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets of the firm, DEBT is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets, BANK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a banking target, 
PRE-1999 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred prior to passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 (US Senate Committee, 1999), EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets, and DIVERSE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
observation represents an acquisition in another SIC code.  
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Long-Run Returns 
To explain the variation in wealth effects in the long-run event windows, buy-and-hold returns for 12 
months are modeled to be a function of the same variables that are used to explain variation in valuation 
effects among acquisitions. The cross-sectional model is specified as: 
 
BHAR = β 0 + β 1LNMVL + β 2CASH + β 3DEBT + β 4BANK + β 5PRE-1999  + β 6EBITDA +  
β 7DIVERSE + εi                               (3) 
 
Where BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return over the 12 month window, and the remaining 
variables were defined previously. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Impact on Wealth 
The effect of the acquisition on the value of the companies in the sample and sub-samples is 
documented in Table 3.  
The cumulative abnormal return for the (0,0) event window is 0.37%, representing a gain of $44 
million for firms with the average market capitalization of $119 billion. Overall, the captive finance 
subsidiaries that participated in an acquisition earned significant positive abnormal returns in the event 
windows surrounding the announcements. The number of positive returns were significantly larger then 
the number of negative returns at the 5% level. These results support Hypothesis 1 that the acquisition 
announcement will create significant positive abnormal returns for the captive finance acquirer. 
These results support the reasoning that captive finance subsidiaries have access to low cost capital 
through their parent companies and operate under strict corporate control. The access to available funds 
allows them to participate in a greater number of acquisitions and the strict corporate control results in a 
better valuation of the target. There are some differences in the wealth effects on the parent in the event 
windows; this could indicate a distinction in perception by the market of the targets that are acquired. 
Next, we explore variation in the abnormal return. 
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TABLE 3 
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
This table provides the mean, median and t-statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
  CAR EVENT WINDOW  
Sample Type No. (0,+1) (-1, +1) (0, 0) (-1,0) +/- 
Total sample 524 0.44 
(0.11) 
1.829* 
0.38 
(-0.06) 
0.588 
0.37 
(0.05) 
2.066** 
0.31 
(-0.09) 
0.339 
271/253 
(1.983)** 
Bank Target 54 -0.42 
(-0.47) 
-1.272 
-0.48 
(-0.22) 
-1.642 
-0.47 
(-0.31) 
-2.077** 
-0.52 
(-0.27) 
-2.051** 
23/31 
(0.687) 
Non-Bank Target 470 0.57 
(0.16) 
2.375** 
0.53 
(-0.02) 
1.192 
0.48 
(0.09) 
2.874*** 
0.44 
(-0.05) 
1.130 
249/221 
(2.376)** 
Same 3 Digit SIC 
Code Target 
57 0.10 
(0.31) 
0.700 
0.12 
(-0.09) 
-0.239 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.317 
0.09 
(-0.06) 
-0.553 
31/26 
(0.981) 
Different 3 Digit 
SIC Code Target 
467 0.51 
(0.11) 
1.845* 
0.46 
(-0.04) 
0.828 
0.42 
(0.04) 
2.178** 
0.37 
(-0.10) 
0.691 
241/226 
(1.807)* 
The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
 
Impact on Wealth by Sub-Sample: Bank vs. Non-Bank 
The majority of targets acquired by captive finance subsidiaries are non-bank targets. When the 
sample is divided into bank vs. non-bank target, the results show that captive finance subsidiaries that 
acquired banking targets experience significant negative abnormal returns at the 5% level. For the (0,0) 
one-day event window mean cumulative abnormal returns were a significant negative abnormal return of 
0.47%. This result is consistent with previous research on bank acquisitions, which find negative or 
insignificant abnormal returns. Conversely, when the captive finance subsidiaries acquired non-banking 
targets, they experienced significant positive abnormal returns at the 10% level. In the (0,0) one-day event 
window the return achieved was a significant positive abnormal return of 0.48%. 
These results support Hypothesis 2, which states that the acquisition of a banking target will create 
significant negative abnormal returns. What the results show is that, although captive finance companies 
are a hybrid of a bank and non-bank company that competes well with banks on some levels, they do not 
perform well when acquiring banking assets. This may be attributable to the higher degree of complexity 
or the regulatory constraints in the banking industry.  
 
Impact on Wealth by Sub-Sample: Same vs. Different Industry  
To examine the effect of industry diversification, the sample was divided into targets in the same 
versus different SIC codes than the acquirer. The majority of targets acquired by captive finance 
subsidiaries were in a different SIC code. The results show that the parent companies whose captive 
finance subsidiaries acquired targets that created industrial diversification experienced significant positive 
abnormal returns at the 5% level.  In the (0,0) one-day event window the return achieved was a significant 
positive abnormal return of 0.42%. The sub-sample of targets in the same SIC code was positive but 
insignificant.  
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Impact on Long-Run Wealth  
The effect of the acquisition on the long-run value of the companies in the sample is documented in 
Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4  
LONG-RUN ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
This table provides the mean, t-test statistics (one sample and paired sample), and p-values  
for the long-run abnormal returns. 
 
LONG-RUN RETURNS EVENT WINDOW 
Sample Type No. (1,6) (1,12) (1, 18) (1,24) (1,36) 
Total sample 489 0.080 
12.335 
0.000**** 
0.181 
12.798 
0.000**** 
0.250 
14.728 
0.000**** 
0.372 
15.948 
0.000**** 
0.559 
8.072 
0.000**** 
SIC Matched 
Control Sample 
489 -0.006 
-0.294 
0.769 
-0.041 
-0.994 
0.321 
-0.030 
-0.663 
0.508 
0.049 
1.132 
0.258 
0.014 
0.223 
0.824 
Bank Control 
Sample 
489 -0.004 
-0.304 
0.761 
0.010 
0.602 
0.547 
-0.011 
-0.496 
0.620 
0.047 
1.679 
0. 090* 
0.053 
1.394 
0.164 
Total Sample vs. 
SIC Code Match 
Sample 
489 0.083 
4.393 
0.000**** 
0.223 
5.685 
0.000**** 
0.323 
6.627 
0.000**** 
0.286 
8.720 
0.000**** 
0.532 
9.923 
0.000**** 
Total Sample vs. 
Bank Match 
Sample 
489 0.086 
9.276 
0.000**** 
0.176 
12.955 
0.000**** 
0.263 
14.748 
0.000**** 
0.327 
14.888 
0.000**** 
0.518 
17.572 
0.000**** 
The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
 
 
The results show significant positive abnormal returns for the parents of the captive finance 
subsidiaries in a long-run time period. The returns are significant at the 0.01% level. The acquisitions 
created a mean return of 0.372% over the two-year time period with similar results overall. Two matched 
samples were created with which to compare these results. The first consisted of firms in the same SIC 
code as the acquirer parent, and the second consisted of banks chosen on the basis of comparable size to 
the captive finance unit. Neither the SIC matched sample nor the Banking matched sample experienced 
acquisitions by captive finance subsidiaries over the event periods. While the SIC matched sample 
showed insignificant abnormal returns overall, the Banking matched sample, which experienced small 
positive returns at the 10% level of significance in the two-year time period.  
The results of the captive finance sample and the control samples were compared to determine if they 
differed significantly from each other. The captive finance long run returns were significantly different 
from both the SIC and Banking matched samples in all time periods at the 0.01% level of significance. 
These results may be credited to the high level of corporate control that captive finance subsidiaries 
experience. The environment they operate under prevents them from taking part in acquisitions that are 
motivated by “empire building” or the “hubris hypothesis.”  
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The results of the multivariate regression on the CARs are displayed in Table 5.  
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TABLE 5  
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS ON (0,0) CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression where CAR, Cumulative abnormal return over 1 
day window, (0,0), is the dependent variable. LNMVL = log of market value of acquirer; CASH = ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets; DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets; BANK = dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the target is a bank; DIVERSE = dummy variable equal to 1 if the target from another SIC 
code; PRE-1999 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred prior to 1999; EBITDA = 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CONSTANT 0.050 
(3.647)**** 
0.409 
(3.372)*** 
0.044 
(2.775)*** 
0.028 
(1.787)* 
LNMVL -0.291 
(3.975)**** 
-0.312 
(-4.164)**** 
-0.309 
(-4.103)**** 
-0.258 
(-3.431)*** 
CASH 0.190 
(3.007)*** 
0.167 
(2.442)** 
0.170 
(2.485)** 
0.184 
(2.640)*** 
DEBT 0.009 
(0.136) 
-0.041 
(-0.547) 
-0.037 
(-0.498) 
-0.002 
(-0.023) 
BANK -0.214 
(-3.345)*** 
-0.238 
(-3.665)**** 
-0.221 
(-3.265)*** 
 
DIVERSE  
 
 0.055 
(0.837) 
0.117 
(1.816)* 
PRE-1999 -0.151 
(-2.109)** 
-0.156 
(-2.146)** 
-0.159 
(-2.180)** 
-0.164 
(-2.198)** 
EBITDA  0.129 
(1.672)* 
0.127 
(1.644) 
0.110 
(1.403) 
     
Adj Rsq 12.70% 15.70% 15.60% 11.70% 
F-statistic 7.498**** 7.635**** 6.635*** 5.698**** 
N 226 215 215 215 
 
The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
 
Several models were used to explain the variation in CARs for the captive finance acquisition sample. 
For all models, the log of market values is negative and significant at the 1% level. The level of liquidity 
as measured by the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets is positive and significant in each of 
the four models. This variable is significant at the 5% level or higher; indicating that access to cash 
increases the positive returns to the acquirer. This is one of the advantages of captive finance subsidiaries 
discussed earlier. Access to low cost capital through the parent company is a decided advantage. The 
BANK dummy representing a banking target is included in three of the four models, and it is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in all three. This is in support of Hypothesis 2 and coincides with the sub-
sample univariate results, which indicate that captive finance companies are not able to integrate banking 
assets successfully. The DIVERSE dummy, representing acquisitions of targets from another industry is 
insignificant and positive in the presence of the BANK dummy, but significant and positive at the 10% 
level with the removal of the BANK dummy. These results would seem to support Hypothesis 2, which 
says that acquiring a banking target creates poor results for the captive finance subsidiary. A variable 
representing profitability, EBITDA, is positive in the models when it is included. 
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Cross-Sectional Regression: Long-Run Abnormal Returns  
The results of the multivariate regression on the long-run abnormal returns are displayed in Table 6.  
 
TABLE 6  
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS ON (1,12) LONG-RUN ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression where C112, Long-run abnormal return over 1 
year window, (1,12), is the dependent variable. LNMVL = log of market value of acquirer; CASH = ratio 
of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets; BANK = dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the target is a bank; DIVERSE = dummy variable equal to 1 if the target from 
another SIC code; PRE-1999 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred prior to 1999; 
EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
CONSTANT -0.492 
(-5.217)**** 
-0.474 
(-5.197)*** 
LNMVL 0.342 
(7.036)**** 
0.352 
(6.995)**** 
CASH -0.135 
(-2.889)*** 
-0.135 
(-2.893)*** 
DEBT -0.095 
(-2.106)** 
-0.089 
(-1.976)** 
BANK  0.025 
(0.587) 
DIVERSE 0.038 
(0.935) 
 
PRE-1999 0.491 
(10.816)**** 
0.493 
(10.864)**** 
EBITDA 0.070 
(1.474) 
0.165 
(1.365) 
   
Adjusted R-squared 24.70% 24.60% 
F-statistic 26.12**** 26.003**** 
N 461 461 
 
The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
 
For all models, the log of market value is positive and significant at the 1% level or higher. This 
coincides with the previous results, which indicate that a larger size is an advantage for the acquirer. The 
level of liquidity as measured by the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets is negative and 
significant in each of the models. This variable is significant at the 1% level or higher; contrary to earlier 
results liquidity has a negative impact on the long run returns to the acquirer. This could be a penalty for 
having excess cash available on the parent company level that could be abused by management. The debt 
to total asset ratio is negative and significant at the 5% level. The obligations when a firm holds debt may 
be the cause of the negative relationship between debt and long-run returns. The other variables are not 
significant.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Our objective is to shed light on the performance of captive finance companies in response to their 
acquisitions. We find that finance companies experience positive and significant abnormal returns upon 
announcement and post-acquisition. We explain these results with the particular circumstances of the 
captive finance subsidiary. The subsidiary is accountable to their parent company for the actions that they 
take and have access to funding through their parent company. The accountability helps to ensure that the 
acquisitions are value adding. Access to funding lowers the cost of acquiring a target, which benefits the 
acquirer. This is supported by the cross-sectional analysis showing that the liquidity variable was positive 
and significant. Finally we see that the market response at the time of the announcement is positive when 
finance companies acquire non-banking targets. These results indicate that while captive finance 
companies can succeed in creating positive returns through acquisitions they are negatively impacted 
when acquiring assets that fall under the strict regulations of the banking industry. This paper was 
motivated by the unique characteristics of captive finance firms and the benefits they receive from 
operating without the compliance requirements and regulations of the banking industry. The results of this 
paper support the decision of firms to establish captive finance subsidiaries.  
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